IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
FINANCIAL SERVICES DIVISION

CAUSE NO. FSD 203 0F 2020 (NSJ)

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT (2015 REVISION)

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR THE LIMITED ADMISSION OF LUKA KRSLJANIN AS AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS IN FSD CAUSE NUMBER 203 OF 2020 (NSJ)

ON THE PAPERS

Before: **The Hon. Mr Justice Segal**

Draft judgment circulated: **25 February 2022**

Judgment delivered: **1 March 2022**

HEADNOTE

Application for the limited admission of junior counsel – the need for unusual and special circumstances – establishing that the proceedings concerned are large and complex is insufficient of itself - the need to consider the availability of local attorneys and the resources available in the local legal services market as well as the steps taken to engage and the role to be given to Cayman attorneys – the relevance of the limited capacity of the local law firm involved

JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. This is my judgment on the application by Mr Luka Krsljanin pursuant to section 4(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act (2015 Revision) (the ***Act***) to be admitted to practise as an Attorney-at-Law in the Cayman Islands for the limited purpose of appearing on behalf of Mr Jafar, the

plaintiff in cause No. FSD 203 of 2020 (NSJ) (the ***Proceedings***). Mr Krsljanin is a well-respected junior barrister practising at Blackstone Chambers in London, with particular expertise in discovery issues (who was called in 2013). He has been instructed by Nelsons, the Cayman Islands attorneys for Mr Jafar to advise in relation to the Proceedings.

2. The application was dated 11 October 2021 (before the coming into effect of the 2022 revision of the Act) and was supported by the First and Second Affidavits of Mr. Steven Barrie, a partner in Nelsons, sworn on 11 October 2021 and 2 December 2021 respectively. Nelsons had also filed written submissions dated 2 December 2021 and supplemental written submissions dated 15 February 2022 (no submissions were originally filed with the application and Mr Barrie's First Affidavit).

3. The application has had a rather unfortunate history. It was only passed to me on 3 February 2022 and then without Mr Barrie's Second Affidavit. The Second Affidavit had been filed in response to a request by the Court, following receipt of the application, for further evidence and submissions. The application had initially been reviewed by the office of the Clerk of Court prior to being assigned to a judge and Nelsons had been told that since the application was for the limited admission of junior counsel, the evidence initially filed in support and the grounds relied on were wholly inadequate (a point reiterated by me in an email to Nelsons dated 4 February 2022 sent before I had seen Mr Barrie's Second Affidavit).

4. On 18 February 2022, I informed Nelsons of my decision as follows:

> *"I have now had an opportunity to read Nelsons' further written submissions dated 15 February, responding to my request for further submissions of the same date.*
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> *While I have not found the arguments made in those submissions persuasive, I have decided to grant Mr Krsljanin's application primarily on the basis that the evidence shows that (a) steps have been taken to base Mr Jafar's legal team in (and to re-locate it to) Cayman, and to engage Nelsons as Mr Jafar's lead attorneys, and that Mr Krsljanin's involvement is required to facilitate this (so that his role, with Mr Bloch QC, is and will be to support and not displace the Cayman legal team) and (b) it has not been possible to find a local lawyer, despite apparently genuine and serious efforts within a reasonable time frame, who would be able to fulfil the role to be played by Mr Krsljanin. It seems to me that the principle referred to in section 35(4)(c) of the Legal Services Act is relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion and is to be taken into account when the Court is considering whether to grant an application for limited admission.*

I am in the process of preparing a short judgment setting out my reasons in a little more detail and shall distribute this shortly.

5. I now set out my reasons in more detail.

The Evidence

6. Mr Barrie's evidence dealt with the following matters: the Proceedings; the number of lawyers working and available to work on the case at Nelsons; the other legal advisers (including law firms and barristers) who had been and were now instructed to advise Mr Jafar in relation to the Proceedings; the legal teams advising the other parties to the Proceedings and Mr Krsljanin's role in the legal team advising Mr Jafar. Mr Barrie concluded (at [36] of his Second Affidavit) that "*In the circumstances, I consider it to be reasonable for Mr Jafar to retain Junior Counsel from London and accordingly request that Mr Krsljanin be granted limited admission for that purpose.*" In his First Affidavit, Mr Barrie had said (at [6]) that *"In my view, this is a case which requires both leading counsel and junior counsel given its scale and complexity. Given the limited number of leading counsel presently admitted in the Cayman Islands, the number of parties in the proceedings and the broad scope for conflict of local counsel in light of the scale of this case (and associated proceedings), I am of the view that this is a matter in which it is necessary and appropriate for Mr. Luka Krsljanin to be admitted to the Cayman bar to act in these proceedings."*

7. Mr Barrie provided brief details of the Proceedings (a summary of the Proceedings can be found in my judgment dated 10 August 2021 dealing with applications for security for costs). He pointed out that the Proceedings were large and complex. They involved a very large claim (for approximately US$350 million) arising out of a complex and multi-jurisdictional fraud, that were being tried together and jointly case managed with other related proceedings and required a large legal team with specialised knowledge and expertise that was able to devote substantial time to the litigation. This was, he said, evidenced by the size and scale of the discovery exercise that was currently contemplated. He noted (at [14] of his Second Affidavit) that "*Going forward, there will inevitably be a mammoth disclosure exercise to undertake requiring substantial input from clients, counsel and attorneys.*"

8. Mr Barrie noted that other large law firms had previously been instructed by Mr Jafar in relation to the collapse of the Abraaj Group. Initially Mr. Jafar had instructed Gibson Dunn in London to advise him on what claims he could bring and where would be the best place

to bring them. He had also retained Kobre & Kim in the Cayman Islands to represent his interests in the liquidation proceedings relating to the Abraaj Group companies. In early 2019 he had instructed Jones Day in London to advise on the recovery of the loans which Mr Jafar alleges he made and when it became clear that proceedings would need to be commenced in this jurisdiction Nelsons were instructed as Mr Jafar's attorneys of record. Subsequently, Mr Jafar had taken steps to ensure that main legal work in relation to the Proceedings would be done in the Cayman Islands. As Mr Barrie said (at [20] in his Second Affidavit):

> *"… [Mr Jafar had] sought to move the base of operations and the bulk of the workload from the Jones Day team in London to Nelsons. Given Jones Day's extensive knowledge of the case, and significant resources, initially they had remained very much involved. Had this not been the case, a small firm such as ours would not have had immediate capacity to accept instructions of this nature. However, Jones Day's involvement in the case was gradually reduced up to the point where, as of the end of October 2021 they provide only minimal consultation services and have no further role in the day-to-day conduct of the Proceedings."*

9. Mr Barrie also provided details of the full legal team that is now advising the Plaintiff in relation to the Proceedings. At Nelsons, Mr Harris, together with a senior and junior associate were spending substantial amounts of time on the case and were occasionally assisted by another associate. Mr Bloch QC, also of Blackstone Chambers, and Mr Luka Krsljanin were instructed (and replaced another silk and junior barrister who had originally been instructed but became too busy) and were fully involved in the case. They were all supported by Mr Hooper, who was Mr Jafar's in-house counsel based in Sharjah, acting on behalf of Mr Jafar.

10. Mr Barrie explained that Nelsons had limited resources and had struggled to allocate sufficient attorneys to the case. He said that Nelsons is a "*small firm with seven full time attorneys, three consultants and three administrative staff*", that four of the attorneys practise in litigation and that three attorneys were currently assigned to the Proceedings (with Mr John Harris being the partner with overall responsibility for the instruction). He said that *"Nelsons has found the resourcing of this matter to be challenging*" and that while there were other members of the firm who were not generally working on this case, they had other client work and commitments and were not therefore available to provide the additional full-time resource that was needed. Mr Barrie confirmed that Nelsons had sought to recruit and employ additional attorneys to supplement their team but had been unable to do so. He said as follows:

> *"23. ..... we have for the last several months been seeking to recruit one, or even two new junior associates from within the Cayman Islands, ideally around three to five years' call. We reached the point of making an offer to one candidate and it appeared he was going to join but ultimately his existing firm persuaded him to stay with them. We are continuing our efforts to recruit locally but, having been unsuccessful to date we have also begun to look overseas.*
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> *24. We are not alone in finding the recruitment of attorneys to be very difficult in the current economic climate. We have interviewed candidates both within the jurisdiction and overseas to seek to fill this role, but to date have been unable to locate anyone with the requisite qualifications and experience."*

11. Mr Barrie explained the role that Mr Krsljanin plays as a member of the wider legal team. He is said to be "*a key part of the existing team*" who works closely with Mr Bloch QC, with Nelsons and with the client team based in the UAE. Mr Barrie said that Mr Bloch QC had advised that from his perspective it was essential to have a junior available to assist him in the same geographical location and the same time zone. Mr Barrie said that Mr Krsljanin would play a particularly important role in the discovery process:

> *"The review process of discovery in the Proceedings will be extensive, together with the various legal arguments on the issue which are bound to arise. It will be beyond the capability of the Nelsons team as it presently stands to complete this without assistance. Even if we are successful in recruiting, as hoped, the standard notice period within the Cayman Islands is in the region of three months and if we are obliged to recruit from overseas, we also have to factor in the time it takes for someone to get themselves in a position to relocate to a new country."*

12. Mr Barrie also referred to the legal counsel teams instructed by the other parties to the Proceedings and noted that a junior barrister from London (Ms Sarah Tresman) who was advising one of the parties had been granted limited admission to appear in the Proceedings.

The Submissions

13. In their written submissions, Nelsons:

(a). referred to section 4(1) of the Act, the requirements of Practice Direction 4 of 2012 (***PD4***), the judgment of the Chief Justice in *In the matter of various applications for the grant of limited admission as an attorney-at-law of the Cayman Islands* [2015 (2) CILR 338]) (***AHAB***) and my judgment in *In the matter of an application by Mr Ciaran Keller to be admitted to practise as an attorney-at-law in the Cayman Islands* (unreported, 1

April 2021, cause no. Att 29 of 2021) (***Keller***).

(b). submitted that the matters to which the Court should have regard on an application under section 4(1) of the Act were (or at least included) those competing public interest considerations which the Chief Justice in *AHAB* said it was appropriate to take into account, namely:

(i). the availability of local lawyers.

(ii). the importance of adequate safeguards to protect the growth and development of the local bar and to prevent the outsourcing of legal work save in exceptional cases.

(iii). the party's need for adequate legal representation and the nature and complexity of the case.

(iv). the expertise and experience of the counsel seeking admission.

(v). the proposed counsel's involvement in the conduct of the litigation.

(vi). whether the work would be conducted in, or from within, the Cayman Islands.

(c). said that in *Keller* I had "*emphasised the high threshold requirement that there be unusual and special circumstances to warrant the admission of junior counsel*" (but Nelsons did not mention or quote paragraph 7 of PD4 which states that *"the limited admission of junior counsel, solicitors or the equivalent will not normally be granted except in unusual and special circumstances which must be fully set out in the Attorney's Affidavit"* – nor for that matter did Mr Barrie mention it).

(d). argued that the high threshold was met in this case having regard not only to "*the important factor of the scale and complexity of the Proceedings*" but also taking account of the following further factors:

(i). Mr Krsljanin's involvement did not reduce the workload undertaken and to be undertaken by Cayman based attorneys since the Nelsons team was at full, and

had been unable to expand its, capacity. His involvement did not reduce the amount of work to be done by the Nelsons team and other Cayman attorneys were not available to be brought in to join that team. Nelsons had tried but to date failed to recruit additional attorneys (it appeared that since any new recruits would need to give at least three-month's notice, even if Nelsons were able to find a new attorney, it would be a considerable period, during which important developments in the proceedings would be occurring, before they would be active). Instead Mr Krsljanin would provide crucial support for Nelsons' Cayman based team.

(ii). it was important for firms in the Cayman Islands of Nelsons' size (in order to be able to compete with larger firms and to take on larger cases) to be able to bring in junior barristers such as Mr Krsljanin to support their work in large and complex cases such as the Proceedings and to give them time to expand their local resources to be able to manage such cases (to bridge the gap between taking on the case with their existing and limited resources and the point at which they had been able to recruit new Cayman attorneys to do the required work, which was bound to take some time).

(iii). Mr Jafar had increasingly sought to ensure that legal work was carried out by the Cayman Islands team and not by overseas attorneys. While this was motivated by a desire to ensure cost recoverability it had the effect of increasing the volume of work to be done by and the demands on the Cayman based attorneys.

(iv). while Mr Krsljanin would continue to be based in London, it was anticipated that he would travel to and be working in Cayman on a fairly regular basis in view of the fact that there were likely to be CMC's every three months and the trial would last for many weeks.

(v). Mr Krsljanin had the specialist expertise and experience needed for the Proceedings and was an integral part of the legal team who worked closely on a daily basis with the Cayman Islands team and acted as an important conduit between the Cayman Islands team and the client and his supporting team based in the UAE.

14. Following receipt of Nelsons' written submissions, I asked Nelsons to address a further issue which it appeared to me had not been dealt with in their submissions. I noted that in paragraph 13 of my judgment in *Keller* I had referred for completeness to section 35(4)(c) of the Legal Services Act, which was at that time and is still not yet in force. That subsection states as follows (underlining added):

> *"in the case of an application to allow a person, other than a Queen's Counsel, or equivalent, and practising as such in any court of a jurisdiction referred to in section 32(3), to appear, to advise or to act in a specified suit or matter, that there are exceptional circumstances to justify approving the application and for this purpose, the fact that the applicant law firm does not itself have sufficient capacity to act or to advise in the specified suit or matter shall not be considered an exceptional circumstance.*"

I requested that Nelsons make submissions on whether the sub-section, and in particular the underlined words, represented a codification of or statement based on existing policy or law such that the principle set out in the underlined words was to be applied or taken into account by the Court on an application under section 4(1) of the Act, even before section 35(4)(c) had come into force, and if it was to be applied or taken into account, how it affected the current application in circumstances where Nelsons' limited resources and its position as a small firm were relied on in support of the application (albeit as one of a number of relevant factors).

15. Nelsons responded in their supplemental written submissions. They argued that section 35(4)(c) (which might never come into force) did not represent a codification of the existing law since under the current law the requirement was to show "*unusual and special circumstances*" rather than "*exceptional circumstances"* and since Parliament had used different words it was to be inferred that the meaning of the terms was different. Furthermore, the principle referred to in the underlined words represented a departure from the existing law as explained by the Chief Justice in *AHAB* since currently the Court must take into account a number of factors including the availability of local lawyers and promoting the growth of the legal profession. Alternatively, even if the principle represented a factor that the Court could and should currently take into account, the lack of capacity of the Cayman law firm concerned was one of the factors to be considered by the Court, even if lack of capacity did not suffice of itself. Nelsons said that in the present case their lack of resources was not the only ground on which the application was based and submitted that the application should not be refused in principle because of it. There were other factors detailed in Mr Barrie's affidavits which should also be taken into account, including the logistical difficulties caused by the different time zones, the size and complexity of the case, Mr Krsljanin's

particular experience in issues of discovery, and the fact that the other parties have also found it necessary to instruct junior counsel (with Ms Tresman having been given limited admission). Nelsons also pointed out that in *AHAB*, the Chief Justice had in fact allowed the limited admission of two of the seven foreign juniors in respect of whom the application was made, suggesting that the approach to be taken was one of balancing rather than of absolutes.

Discussion and the reasons for my decision

16. The language of section 4(1) of the Act and PD4 (in particular paragraph 7 of PD4) is set out and explained in *AHAB* and *Keller* and does not need to be repeated here. But I do think it that is helpful to highlight some of the comments made in *AHAB* and *Keller* on the approach to be taken by the Court on an application for the limited admission of junior counsel.

17. In *AHAB*, the Chief Justice said as follows (underlining added):

> *"23 There are well-recognized practical reasons for the public interest considerations similarly identified at para. 5 and at (a) and (b) above. They include the fact that the many law firms and practitioners within the Islands are usually quite able to provide the kind of professional services needed for even the most complex kinds of civil and commercial litigation. In order to do so, they must commit to the maintenance of extensive resources in terms of personnel and capital while competing among themselves. It must be assumed that their continued ability to do so would be significantly impaired if they had generally to compete with foreign lawyers as well. The routine granting of applications such as these would therefore be injurious to the interests of the local profession.*
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> *24. And so, s.4 of the [Act] must be construed as intended, among other things, to protect the local profession from undue foreign competition. This, it must be emphasized, is not only for the sake of the profession: it is also in the public interest that there is a strong and viable body of legal practitioners available to meet the public's need for legal advice and representation.*
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> *25 While the [Act] (and [PD4]) will regard more liberally a litigant's wish to instruct leading counsel from overseas, recognizing the relatively small and select cadre of silks available in the Islands, a different view must be taken of a desire to bring in junior counsel and solicitors from overseas. As already noted, these latter groups will typically bring with them the kind of experience and expertise which is in ready supply from among the local practitioners and it is for this reason that the LPL, the GCR, O.68 costs rules and Practice Direction No. 4 of 2012 are together construed as imposing a public policy requirement that unusual and special circumstances must be shown before such applications will be granted."*

18. In *Keller* I said as follows:

> "*14. Each application for limited admission of a junior counsel requires a rigorous examination of all the relevant circumstances to see whether it can be justified, having regard to the need for the applicant currently to show "unusual and special circumstances" and taking into account the criteria identified by the Chief Justice in AHAB (and, once the Legal Services Act has come into force, having the regard for the need for the applicant to show "exceptional circumstances" and taking into account the criteria identified in section 35(5)).*
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> *15. The precondition that unusual and special circumstances must be shown makes it clear that there is a high threshold to be crossed before the Court will accede to such an application (and the new statutory language of exceptional circumstances, which seems to me to be a statutory codification of the approach in PD4, emphasises that the precondition will not easily be satisfied). There is effectively a presumption against the limited admission of junior counsel.*
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> *16. It seems to me that the complexity and scale of the litigation are not of themselves sufficient. They are important factors to be taken into account but the Court must also weigh and balance the other criteria when generally assessing whether the limited admission can be justified. The role to be performed by the junior barrister, the availability of similarly and suitably qualified local attorneys who could fill that role, the steps that have been taken to locate such attorneys and the balance of the legal team engaged to prepare for and conduct the litigation will, for example, also be of considerable weight. It will be relevant for the Court to understand whether efforts were made at the earliest opportunity to involve local attorneys in the development and preparation of the case to be presented in the proceedings before the Court.*
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> *……*
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> *18. Of course, the effect of granting an application for limited admission is only to permit the participation of and recovery of the legal fees of the junior counsel from and after the time at which the application is granted. The focus of the Court's attention must be on the role to be performed by junior counsel and the extent to which that role can be justified having regard to the relevant factors. Where the role and the extent of the involvement of junior counsel is clear and limited, for example because junior counsel is to be admitted in order to allow him or her to travel to Cayman in order to make final preparations for and appear at the listed trial of the claim, then it may be easier to justify the granting of limited admission.*

19. As is clear from these passages, the Court is focussed, when considering whether to grant limited admission to junior counsel from overseas, on the need to avoid undermining the competitive position of the local law firms by admitting foreign practitioners to do work for which there is a ready supply of suitably qualified local attorneys. As I noted in *Keller*, the

"*role to be performed by the junior barrister, the availability of similarly and suitably qualified local attorneys who could fill that role, the steps that have been taken to locate such attorneys and the balance of the legal team engaged to prepare for and conduct the litigation will … be of considerable weight*." The various competing public interest considerations which the Solicitor General had identified, and which the Chief Justice considered appropriate to be taken into account by the Court, in *AHAB* must, in my view, be understood and applied against this background and in this context. So must PD4's requirement that there be "*unusual and special circumstances*."

20. While the Court is concerned to ensure that the relevant party is properly represented by suitably qualified lawyers of their choice, where there is a "*ready supply*" of local attorneys who are properly qualified and available, then the party will generally in the case of junior counsel not be permitted to have the costs benefits associated with limited admission (of course, the party retains the right to instruct junior counsel but if he chooses to do so when the local Bar is able to provide suitable advice and assistance, he will be unable to recover the costs of that junior counsel in a taxation on the standard basis).

21. But in some cases, there will be a genuine issue as to whether, in view of the complexities and challenges of a particular piece of litigation and the resources and skill set of the available Cayman Islands attorneys, the local Bar can be said to provide, or have readily available, a sufficient number of suitably qualified and experienced attorneys to meet the party's reasonable needs for legal advice and advocacy. In the case of silks, the Court will readily accept that there is a justified need to look to and instruct Leading Counsel in London because of their specialist skills in advocacy and expertise in particular areas of the law and the limited number of similarly senior and specialised advocates based in the Islands.

22. Equally, there may be cases in which, there is a similar deficit between local resources and reasonable needs in relation to junior counsel. But in most (the usual) cases, the Cayman Island Bar will be able to meet that need. The size and complexities of the case will not, on their own, justify the limited admission of junior counsel (as I pointed out in *Keller*). There must in addition be some reason shown why the local Bar cannot provide the required advice and assistance. There must be a link between the size and complexity of the case and a demonstrated limit in the capacity or expertise of the local Bar. To justify the limited admission of junior counsel, it must

be shown that in the circumstances of the case, there is good reason to believe that the local Bar cannot provide the requisite expertise or resources to do the job required.

23. It also seems to me that the Court is conclude that the limited capacity of the local law firm concerned is not of itself sufficient to justify the limited admission of junior counsel. In my view, the statutory discretion given by section 4(1) of the Act and the direction to limit the admission of junior counsel to cases of unusual and special circumstances, already allows the Court to regard the limited capacity of one firm as not being determinative and not necessarily of great weight. The policy which informs PD4 and the Court's approach is focussed on protecting and preserving the local Bar as a whole and not firms who have taken on cases for which they have insufficient local resources. So it seems to me that the principle referred to in section 35(4)(c) of the Legal Services Act is one which the Court is able in appropriate cases to take into account and is already reflected in the current law, even before the Legal Services Act comes into force. Having said that, the Court will be sympathetic to the needs of smaller local firms that find themselves in difficulty because they are struggling to staff a case, where the firm concerned has not acted irresponsibility in accepting instructions in a case that they cannot deal with (or perhaps where, because of the number of other local firms already involved, conflicts prevent the party concerned from instructing other firms) and taken adequate and timely steps to employ additional local attorneys to fill the gap. What will clearly be unacceptable is for the party concerned to instruct a small local law firm and then seek the limited admission of junior counsel (and indeed more than one junior counsel) on the basis that the local firm involved has insufficient capacity to deal with the case.

24. In the present application, Nelsons, in presenting the case for Mr Krsljanin's limited admission, placed too much weight on the size and complexity of the Proceedings. I had the sense that they thought that there was almost a presumption that junior counsel should be admitted in any large and complex proceedings. Nonetheless, after being requested to think again and file further submissions and evidence, they did properly and helpfully focus on the particular circumstances of this case which related to the manner in and extent to which Cayman attorneys were being used and instructed by Mr Jafar, the resources available in this jurisdiction and the steps that they had taken to use local attorneys before seeking to justify the limited admission of Mr Krsljanin. It then became clear that Mr Jafar had taken action to ensure that the legal centre of gravity of the team advising him on the Proceedings was in the Cayman Islands; that the work previously being done by the solicitors from London had been largely stopped, so that work that could be

done by the Cayman team was in fact being done by them; that Nelsons had engaged in a good faith effort ("*for the last several months*") to recruit additional local attorneys to provide the additional resources they needed; that they had been unable to recruit any new staff and that local market conditions appeared to have contributed to this inability to recruit. These facts and matters show that there are inadequate resources available in the jurisdiction to meet Mr Jafar's reasonable needs for legal advice and support and that reasonable efforts have been made to engage local attorneys to the maximum extent practicable and to fill the gaps in Nelsons' current resources. In such circumstances, and in a situation where, as here, it has been demonstrated that the proceedings in question demand substantial legal resources and that the junior counsel whose admission is sought has the required expertise and experience and will play an important and useful role as part of the legal team whose main members are based here, unusual and special circumstances have been shown to exist and the case for granting the limited admission applicable is, in my view, made out. It did occur to me that, since Mr Barrie had said that his firm was continuing to look for new recruits, so that the gaps in Nelsons' resources might be filled in due course, I should admit Mr Krsljanin only for the period before that had been done. But in my view that would not be right, at least in this case, where it remains unclear how long it will take for Nelsons to recruit additional staff and where it is unlikely that aggregate costs will be increased if Mr Krsljanin retains (indeed it is likely to be more cost-effective to allow Mr Krsljanin to retain) his limited admission for the duration of the Proceedings.

25. I would add that, as I noted in *Keller* (see [20] of the judgment), the mere fact that another junior counsel was granted limited admission to act for another party to the Proceedings on the basis of a different application (particularly one about which the Court on this application has been told nothing) is to be given little or no weight on this application.

The Hon. Mr Justice Segal
Judge of the Grand Court, Cayman Islands
1 March 2022